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Abstract 
 
 This paper examines the contribution of The Theory of Moral Sentiments to the 
study of how we acquire moral knowledge. In Smith, this is associated with the moral 
judgment of an impartial spectator, a hypothetical ideal conjured in the imagination of an 
agent. This imagined spectator has the properties of impartiality, information and 
sympathy. I argue Smith develops this construct in the context of personal ethics, i.e., as 
a guide to moral conduct in personal relationships. There are limitations, however, to this 
model for personal ethics, as acknowledged by Smith himself and suggested by 
subsequent social science findings. Moreover, this model does not necessarily extend to 
social ethics, i.e., to moral judgment in less personal economic and social interactions, 
such as firms, industries and governments. Hence, I propose modifying the spectator 
model in light of modern social science methods and of Smith’s own insights to address 
its limitations for personal ethics and to provide it with a foundation for social ethics. The 
proposed approach is based on a quasi-spectator, i.e., the empirical analysis of the moral 
views of real spectators whose properties approximate those of the ideal spectator. A 
review of quasi-spectator studies suggests this as a promising method for informing both 
descriptive and prescriptive ethics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This paper is one product of the 2009 conference celebrating the 250th anniversary of 
the publication of the Theory of Moral Sentiments at the Centre for the Study of Mind in 
Nature in Oslo. I wish to thank Maria Carrasco, Thomas Cushman, Sam Fleischacker, 
Christel Fricke and John O’Neill for very helpful and constructive comments. Any 
shortcomings remain, of course, the sole property of the author. 
  
I. Introduction 
 Adam Smith’s first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (hereafter TMS), was 
generally well received and acknowledged as an important contribution to moral theory and 
practice soon after its publication in 1759. Nevertheless, Smith’s second major work, The Wealth 
of Nations (hereafter WN), soon eclipsed TMS and established his reputation as the father of 
modern economics. Smith’s first book, however, has experienced a significant renaissance in 
recent years, prompting a considerable volume of research across the humanities and the social 
sciences. Both the depth and the breadth of recent Smith scholarship have been quite impressive 
and include Brown (1994), Fleischacker (1999), Fricke and Schütt (2005) and Weinstein (2006) 
in philosophy, Ashraf, Camerer and Loewenstein (2005), Rothschild and Sen (2006), Sugden 
(2002) and Verburg (2000) in economics, and Hanley (2008), Parrish (2007) and Rasmussen 
(2006) in political science, among many other notable contributions. 
 The Theory of Moral Sentiments is usually seen as explicating Smith’s moral theory. I 
will focus in this paper on various questions addressed in TMS about the acquisition of moral 
knowledge. What are the conditions for acquiring moral knowledge? What was the social context 
in which Smith developed his model? What are the limitations of his method? Can his approach 
be productively extended to new domains? I believe these questions, and especially their 
answers, are of great importance not only for philosophy but also for the social sciences. 
Clarification of the conditions for the acquisition of moral knowledge can guide descriptive 
analysis of moral learning and moral development. In addition, such a model could inform the 
conduct of social science research and policy itself. That is, social scientists might adopt methods 
inspired by such models to infer empirically the underpinnings of moral conduct and moral rules. 
The lessons produced from these methods could, in turn, serve two purposes. First, they could 
improve the descriptive analysis of the impact of morals on behavior by helping to isolate their 
effects from those of others forces, e.g., self-interest. Second, they could be utilized for 
prescriptive analysis, either to test the consistency of behavior with normative claims or even to 
inform prescriptive analysis. The latter function is not only important for prescriptive theoretical 
work but is particularly critical to social scientists who are called upon to provide policy advice 
and who require some first principles for formulating, evaluating and defending such proposals. 
 Section II of this paper describes Smith’s approach to moral judgment, which involves 
each agent constructing in his or her imagination an impartial spectator, who provides a model 
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for evaluating and directing right conduct. Section III summarizes Smith’s ethics, i.e., some of 
the conclusions at which Smith arrives using this model. Section IV presents limitations of 
Smith’s model and a new Adam Smith Problem that concerns the acquisition of moral 
knowledge in TMS and WN. Section V suggests an approach to moral knowledge based on an 
empirical method as a means to address these limitations and bridge the gaps between TMS and 
WN. This involves building on the original model using modern social science methods and 
Smith’s own insights. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Smith’s Epistemic Model 
 TMS is replete with conceptual originality, keen social observation, and philosophical 
insight, including about the acquisition of moral knowledge. Given this, one might expect a 
treatment in it of the broader questions of moral epistemology, e.g., how is moral knowledge 
possible? Nevertheless, as Fleischacker (2004) notes, “Smith has surprisingly little to say, 
directly, about epistemology” (pg. 27), and relatively little has been written about Smith in this 
regard: Harrison (1995) and Kawall (2006) are among few works that even skirt this topic. 
Although Smith did not emphasize epistemology in general terms in his work, TMS is teeming 
with rich, detailed and trenchant statements about moral learning, moral knowledge and moral 
judgment. This paper focuses on the ideal conditions for moral judgment, or what I will call the 
epistemic model, of Adam Smith.1 I believe his thinking in this area represents one of the most 
original, important and exciting of his contributions. 
 That Smith’s subject was, in large part, the acquisition of knowledge about right conduct 
is suggested by the sub-title added with edition 4 of TMS: “An essay towards an analysis of the 
principles by which men naturally judge concerning the conduct and character, first of their 
neighbors, and afterwards of themselves.” This sub-title also portends the dual nature of people 
as both observers and participants, which is developed in TMS. In Smith’s view, a person is 
divided into two parts: the agent and the spectator, who judges the agent as if from a distance: 
“When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, … it is evident that … I divide myself, as it 
were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and the judge, represent a different character 
from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of. The first is the 
                                                 
1 An important, but distinct, topic in TMS is the stages of moral learning. Although I will touch on this, the central 
subject matter of this paper concerns the conditions for acquiring moral knowledge by a fully realized moral judge. 
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spectator. … The second is the agent” (III.1.6). This is but one of many instances of Smith 
anticipating much later work in the social sciences. Recent research in psychology and 
economics points to dual-decision-makers, and, in the latter discipline, theoretical accounts of 
dual-self models often refer to a principal and an agent that mirror, in many respects, the roles of 
spectator and agent, respectively, in Smith (e.g., Shefrin and Thaler, 1981). In TMS, as in the 
later empirical research, these dual-selves are often seen as being in conflict. 
 In broad terms, Smith is a successor to earlier ideal observer theories, including those of 
his friend, David Hume, and his mentor, Francis Hutcheson, which deem an action or a rule 
morally right if an ideal observer would approve of it. Whereas spectators were often portrayed 
by his predecessors as real individuals, however, Smith develops a more complex and subtle 
theory. His spectator is not a real person or persons but rather a model conjured in the 
imagination of the agent, and Smith frequently refers to the “imagined” or “supposed” spectator. 
This spectator takes neither the position of the agent nor that of a real bystander, but rather the 
view the agent imagines an ideal observer possesses. 
 Smith fleshes out in some detail the origin of the imagined spectator: he is the product of 
society (see, especially, TMS VI.1). People participate in social interactions and, as real 
spectators (i.e., third parties), judge the behavior of others. This produces the moral sense or 
conscience, which experiences morality chiefly in affective terms. Social approval provides the 
motivation for, but not the ultimate goal of, moral learning: “But this desire of the approbation, 
and the aversion to the disapprobation of his brethren, would not alone have rendered him fit for 
that society for which he was made. Nature, accordingly, has endowed him, not only with a 
desire of being approved of, but with a desire of being what ought to be approved of; or of being 
what he himself approves of in other men. The first desire could only have made him wish to 
appear to be fit for society. The second was necessary in order to render him anxious to be really 
fit” (III.2.6). Indeed, he describes in eds. 2-5 the process of moral learning in considerable detail, 
by which we eventually learn to balance or stand above the sometimes conflicting desires of 
those with whom we deal (III.2). The resulting impartial spectator, as Sugden (2002) writes, 
“represents, in idealized form, the correspondence of sentiments that is induced by social 
interaction.” 
 Smith’s impartial spectator represents a rich and sublime construct, but I believe the core 
characteristics can be distilled into three fundamental properties: impartiality, information and 
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sympathy. First, the spectator is impartial, a modifier that also represents a Smithian addition to 
the language of spectator theory. That is, the impartial spectator is a disinterested (or perhaps 
better stated, detached) third party, who has no stakes in the situation or parties who are being 
evaluated. This, of course, ensures that moral judgments are not tainted by any trace of self-
interest. 
 Second, impartiality must be coupled with the necessary information conditions. Smith 
states that the morally relevant judgments are those of the “impartial and well-informed 
spectator.” Although, at various points, he acknowledges the challenges to ideal impartiality, 
these conditions are not an unattainable abstraction but rather a state that real people can 
sometimes achieve. Importantly, the spectator accesses his own life experiences: “The man who 
is conscious to himself that he has exactly observed those measures of conduct which experience 
informs him are generally agreeable, reflects with satisfaction on the propriety of his own 
behaviour.” Nevertheless, his conduct is not motivated by a desire for social approbation or by 
false consciousness, since “he views it in the light in which the impartial spectator would view it, 
… and though mankind should never be acquainted with what he has done, he regards himself, 
not so much according to the light in which they actually regard him, as according to that in 
which they would regard him if they were better informed.” These passages help underscore the 
importance of these two properties of the imagined spectator. First, the spectator is not and never 
will be implicated in a situation being evaluated, that is, he has no perceived stake that might 
bias his judgments of right and wrong. Second, the spectator is fully informed of the relevant 
particulars and processes this information rationally with respect to internalized values. 
 Third, an important ingredient to spectatorship is sympathy (or fellow-feeling, in the 
terminology of Sugden, 2002). Although the emphasis, both in Smith’s writings and in those of 
many of his commentators, is on sympathy as the mutual sharing of the feelings of others, I 
believe this includes adopting the positions of others quite generally, i.e., both cognitively and 
affectively. I see this kind of sympathy as serving two functions in Smith, similar to the 
distinction Rawls (2000) makes in reference to Hume’s spectator. On the one hand, sympathy 
has an epistemic role that is of relevance to the spectator: it enlarges his awareness of relevant 
facts by enabling him to factor in the experiences and feelings of others in coming to moral 
judgments. On the other hand, sympathy has a motivational function that pertains to the agent 
and helps him to put aside, or at least to moderate, his own interests relative to those of others 
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and to align his conduct more closely with the judgment of the spectator. 
 For the goals of this paper alone, one might argue that sympathy can be subsumed under 
the second property of information where it serves a purely epistemic function. The first two 
properties, impartiality and information, should certainly assume a prominent position in our 
thinking, as they mirror the dual purposes of TMS more generally. On the one hand, it reads like 
a psychological and sociological treatise on the development and practice of social norms that 
might emerge from empiricist philosophy. Both the impact of the spectator on the agent as well 
as the spectator’s search for right conduct are products of unambiguous, if casual, social science 
analysis. On the other hand, the treatment of morals is not solely descriptive but also 
prescriptive: normative words like “should” and “ought” occur with great frequency. The agent’s 
efforts to comply with his moral sentiments and the demands of the spectator are often laid out in 
the first person plural, as Smith exhorts the reader to right conduct and character. For example, 
regarding revenge, he writes “There is no passion, of which the human mind is capable, 
concerning whose justness we ought to be so doubtful, concerning whose indulgence we ought 
so carefully to consult our natural sense of propriety, or so diligently to consider what will be the 
sentiments of the cool and impartial spectator” (I.ii.3.8). That is, TMS is also a guide for 
acquiring and applying moral knowledge in order to promote moral behavior. 
 Perhaps the clearest indication of Smith’s belief in the strength of his model for epistemic 
purposes emerges in his comparative analysis of moral theories in Part VII. For instance, in a 
passage added to the 7th edition, he writes of alternative theories that “None of these systems 
either give, or even pretend to give, any precise or distinct measure by which this fitness or 
propriety of affection can be ascertained or judged of. That precise and distinct measure can be 
found nowhere but in the sympathetic feelings of the impartial and well-informed spectator” 
(VII.ii.1.49). This assertion not only reinforces his many statements elsewhere about the critical 
roles of impartiality, information and sympathy but also elevates his claims to a higher level: his 
theory, unlike all others, provides the means to identify right and to distinguish it from wrong. 
 To summarize, Smith’s account of human nature in TMS presents two sides: the 
imagined spectator and the agent. The imagined spectator is a product of socialization, who 
develops a conscience that is consonant with the values of society and God. The agent attempts 
to apply reflexively the lessons of the former, although Smith distinguishes degrees of success 
from the imperfections of a child or person of weak character to the self-command of the ideal 
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imagined spectator (III.3). The central epistemic claims are that the appropriate moral judge is an 
imagined spectator, who is impartial, informed and sympathetic, and that this ideal spectator can 
be summoned by real people. 
 
III. Smith’s Ethics 
 Up to this point, we have considered Smith’s conditions for moral judgment, or his 
epistemic model, but had nothing to say about the content of such judgments. In other words, we 
have not addressed Smith’s ethics, that is, the particular conclusions or general rules that might 
emerge from his epistemic exercise. Indeed, it is striking how brief and even vague the treatment 
of this topic is in TMS, at least relative to other major contributions to moral philosophy. This is 
surely related to the fact that his theory is grounded in moral sentiments, rather than grand moral 
principles, but I believe it also reflects his primary aim of analyzing moral judgment itself rather 
than fleshing out its content. Nonetheless, a discussion of Smith’s ethics will aid in establishing 
this claim and in laying the groundwork for arguments that follow in this paper. 
 I begin with the broadest question of whether Smith views his epistemic model as leading 
to general conclusions and, if so, to what extent. It seems particularly necessary to address this 
issue in light of the claims of some commentators that Smith is a moral relativist (see 
Rasmussen, 2008, for a clear and concise discussion). This interpretation follows from the 
derivation of Smith’s spectator from the values of society coupled with the claim that moral 
values are heterogeneous across societies. I believe the answer to the first part of this question 
regarding the existence of moral rules is unambiguous: Smith frequently refers in so many words 
to the virtues, rules, principles and measures of conduct that emerge from the aforementioned 
socialization, including “the most sacred rules of morality” (II.ii.3.8). Clearly, Smith maintains 
that moral rules accompany moral learning and moral knowledge. 
 The second part of the question concerns the level of generality of such rules. Smith’s 
system might still be accused of moral relativism, if there exist rules but they are context specific, 
e.g., moral rules hold within societies but differ across them. As Weinstein (2006) discusses, 
related questions arise about reconciling differences within sub-groups of society. Smith, in fact, 
concedes that even slavery and infanticide have, at various times and places, been regarded as 
acceptable. By designing the spectator as the correspondence of society, Smith appears 
vulnerable on this point. But the reader should note that my question above was not whether his 
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moral theory does necessarily lead to general rules, but rather whether Smith sees general 
conclusions as emerging from his epistemic model. In fact, Smith resounding condemns 
practices such as slavery and infanticide and sees them as aberrations on a path otherwise 
characterized by moral progress. In such cases, Smith demurs and subordinates the supposed 
spectator to a higher authority, as discussed in Section V of this paper. 
 Despite occasional ambiguity, the weight of Smith’s writing suggests a universalist 
approach to ethics. Sen (2009), for example, concludes that Smith’s device is one of “open 
impartiality,” which incorporates the moral views of other groups and societies, as opposed to 
“closed impartiality,” which only draws on members of a given group or society (e.g., Rawls). 
Smith does view the relative weight assigned to individual virtues as varying across cultures but 
rules out substantive differences in those virtues: “Though the manners of different nations 
require different degrees of the same quality, in the character which they think worthy of esteem, 
yet the worst that can be said to happen even here, is that the duties of one virtue are sometimes 
extended so as to encroach a little upon the precincts of some other” (V.2.13). 
 Thus far, the emphasis on general conclusions has been on the existence and extent of 
moral rules. But one can think of a different type of generality that pertains not to rules but to 
judgments about specific cases. For instance, suppose each case were judged the same by all 
persons in all societies, even if their judgments could not be characterized otherwise according to 
any rules. Then moral judgments would be universal even if all they were all sui generis. In the 
absence of complete consensus, the degree of universalism might be thought of as the extent of 
moral agreement about some set of specific cases. Alternately, one can think of a world 
characterized by a combination of rules and exceptions. Universalism could be then 
conceptualized in terms of the extent of agreement about moral rules and moral exceptions. In 
fact, Smith’s words often suggest not only universalism but a version that stresses the broad 
application of moral rules to particular cases: “When these general rules … are universally 
acknowledged and established, … we frequently appeal to them as the standard of judgment, in 
debating concerning the degree of praise and blame that is due to certain actions of a complicated 
and dubious nature” (III.4.11). One benefit of and justification for such rules is as a means to 
cope with self-deception, as Fleischacker (2009) points out. For Smith, “self-deceit … is the 
source of half the disorders of human life” (II.4.6). In his divided self model, this involves the 
agent deceiving itself about merit of its conduct when that conduct departs from the dictates of 
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the spectator. Moral rules serve to help overcome this weakness by sanctioning such deviations: 
“Those general rules of conduct, when they have been fixed in our mind by habitual reflection, 
are of great use in correcting the misrepresentations of self-love” (III.4.12). 
 On the other hand, Smith also emphasizes the importance of particular moral judgments 
and exceptions to rules. He acknowledges that the “general rule(s) of almost all of the virtues … 
admit of many exceptions, and require so many modifications, that it is scarce possible to 
regulate our conduct entirely by a regard to them,” and even the most precise rule will “upon the 
most superficial examination … appear to be in the highest degree loose and inaccurate, and to 
admit of ten thousand exceptions” (III.6.9). These statements follow from two claims. First, 
moral rules describe necessary but not sufficient conditions for right conduct and fail to 
incorporate, for example, the virtues of grace and mercy (III.6.1-5). Second, these rules do not 
provide an exhaustive moral guide because of the many interpretative decisions that must 
precede action. 
 Although I find these claims substantively persuasive, I do not believe that they 
necessarily compromise the generality of moral rules but rather might only reflect Smith’s 
particular usage of the terms “rule” and “exception.” On the first claim, Smith equates rules with 
moral norms, which connote rules that are socially sanctioned. But a more inclusive 
characterization of moral rules might integrate non-sanctioned virtues such as grace and mercy. 
On the second claim, I argue that the question is not one of exceptions to rules but rather of the 
practical challenges to interpreting and applying general rules to particular cases. That is, the 
approach Smith describes is not context-specific, since it spans different contexts (e.g., peoples 
and cultures), but it is context-dependent, i.e., the rules are general and apply across contexts but 
their practical implementation is sometimes subject to vagaries due to the existence of alternative 
interpretations of their application, whereby these interpretations depend on the context. As an 
example, Smith discusses the necessity of expressing measured gratitude for a benefactor’s 
services but the challenges to determining the appropriate amount, metric, timing and duration of 
that expression given contextual factors, such as the individual circumstances of the affected 
parties (III.6.9). 
 Thus, I conclude that Smith is a universalist: he believes that his epistemic model leads to 
general moral conclusions. How much more detailed can one be about the content of moral 
conclusions? For this purpose, I believe it is helpful to distinguish Smith’s personal ethics, or his 
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treatment of morality in personal relationships, from his social ethics, or his normative 
statements about more impersonal social interactions, such as with firms, industries and 
governments. His statements about personal ethics are mostly uncontroversial and include 
admonitions against deceit, murder, theft and adultery. Thus, I will focus on Smith’s social 
ethics, in particular, on his discussion of justice, the aspect of social ethics that has received the 
largest share of attention by both Smith and his commentators. Indeed, Witztum (1997) argues 
that “Smith does not have a theory of justice which is clearly distinguishable from his general 
ethics.” 
 The epistemic model for justice is, for Smith, the same as with his personal ethics: justice 
is grounded in the approval and disapproval of the impartial spectator (see, for example, II.2.3. 
and VII.2.1). Beyond that, however, the reader is struck by the negative tone and limited scope 
of most of Smith’s writings about justice. The rules of justice are precise and exacting and are 
often associated with juridical contexts. They concern the potential for harm to others, often 
involving the violation of property rights, and the appropriate punishment for that harm. In fact, 
Smith’s emphasis on commutative justice has contributed to doubts about whether he has a 
distinct theory of distributive justice. Verburg (2000), however, argues that, in Smith’s view, 
commutative justice, which involves the observation of property rights, typically complements 
the aims of distributive justice. Smith sees the observation of rights in commercial society as 
promoting economic growth, which ultimately best serves to raise the least advantaged in 
society, viz., the workers, from poverty to subsistence. Nevertheless, Verburg concludes that 
Smith came increasingly to doubt the path of progress toward this goal and began to 
conceptualize justice in a broader sense. 
 Smith explicitly relates justice to the satisfaction of basic needs and, in turn, to the 
happiness of society: “No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater 
part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe, 
and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own 
labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged” (WN, Book I, Chapter 8). In 
the “other” invisible hand passage in TMS, Smith writes that the rich “are led by an invisible 
hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been 
made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants” such that “in what 
constitutes the real happiness of life, (the poor) are in no respect inferior to those who would 
 9
seem so much above them” (IV.1.10). Indeed, Rasmussen (2006) argues that Smith sees the 
commercial society that drives economic progress as undermining happiness but, nevertheless, 
advocates for it because this effect is more than offset by the disadvantages of overcoming 
poverty. 
 On basic needs and happiness, Smith foretells the conclusions of one school of thought in 
the modern social science research on happiness. The “absolutist” school argues that, at low 
levels of income, improving materials standards help satisfy basic needs and increase happiness, 
but once basic needs are fulfilled additional income has little or no effect on happiness (e.g., 
Veenhoven, 1991). The “relativist” school argues instead that it is relative, not absolute, income 
that matters for happiness (e.g., Easterlin, 1995). Either conclusion, however, presents important 
challenges to welfare economics, which Fleurbaey, Schokkaert and Decancq (2009) discuss and 
attempt to address. 
 In summary, Smith espouses a universalist view of ethics with a prominent role for moral 
rules, partly in order to solve problems of self-deception. I have characterized Smith’s approach 
as context dependent: right conduct obeys general rules that require interpretation in particular 
contexts. He derives both his personal and social ethics from the same epistemic model, i.e., 
from the impartial spectator. His social ethics stress justice, whereby distributive justice is 
associated with the satisfaction of basic needs and, in turn, happiness, representing a precursor of 
important modern social science research. 
 
IV. Ein anderes Adam Smith Problem 
 In this section, I consider possible limitations and shortcomings of Smith’s epistemic 
model. I begin with an analysis of problems associated with using this model, which was 
developed for personal ethics, to acquire knowledge of social ethics. Then I address more general 
limitations of this model, even as applied to personal ethics. 
 The picture of moral motivation and its wide-ranging impact on behavior that is 
presented and praised in fine detail in TMS contrasts with the portrayal in WN of the benefits of 
self-interest. Moreover, the ostensibly conflicting accounts prompted attempts to reconcile them, 
which became known as “das Adam Smith Problem,” after its origins with the German 
economist Bruno Hildebrand in the mid-nineteenth Century. Vivienne Brown (2008) nicely 
summarizes the current consensus that there is, in fact, no inconsistency between the two works. 
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Raphael and Macfie (1976) present one line of thought leading to this conclusion: Smith holds 
both self-interest and virtue to be two important motives in both works, although TMS focuses 
more on the former and WN on the latter. This view garners support from a consideration of the 
differing social contexts that dominate each book. The specifics in TMS deal disproportionately 
with personal, small-scale interactions, where moral norms are more prominent and moral 
reasoning more likely to be activated. The subject matter emphasized in WN, by contrast, is 
larger scale and less personal market and social interactions, such as with firms, industries, and 
governments, where self-interest will more likely arise as the primary motive that affects 
outcomes. Of course, there are exceptions, e.g., Brown (1994) analyzes the expanded discussion 
of statesmen and legislators, which emerged when Part VI was added with ed. 6 of TMS. 
Nevertheless, these stylized facts about personal vs. impersonal domains arguably account for 
the much of the differing emphasis on motives in the two works. 
 As previously noted, TMS contains both descriptive and prescriptive statements, and the 
same is true of WN. In his first work, though, Smith transitions almost seamlessly between the 
two modes, whereas there is a more pronounced change in tone about mid-way in WN from 
empirical observation and analysis to polemic. The fact that Smith advocates for morality in 
TMS and free markets in WN merely serves to accentuate the appearance of conflict. The model 
of agent and spectator outlined in TMS can remove concerns about contradictory assumptions of 
motives. But a potential conflict, or rather gap, still remains: TMS provides a derivation for the 
virtues it espouses, whereas WN implicitly assumes the normative value of the outcomes 
promoted by self-interest. 
 Let me put this more broadly in terms of the epistemic issues that are the topic of this 
paper. TMS presents a clear, if not entirely uncontroversial, statement of the conditions for the 
acquisition of moral knowledge. WN, on the other hand, does not provide an analogous basis for 
desiring the ends it advocates, despite elegant arguments about how the pursuit of self-interest 
can promote economic growth and justice. This differs from the original Adam Smith Problem 
and resembles more recent “Adam Smith problems,” like the one Brown (2008) identifies, which 
represent differences rather than inconsistencies between TMS and WN. But it does seem an odd 
asymmetry that the two works both describe and espouse but that only the first develops a 
distinct epistemic foundation for its advocacy. Certainly, the impartial spectator theory of TMS 
plays no explicit role in WN. The word spectator is used only twice in WN, and not in any 
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clearly moral sense, but rather in the sense of an actual third party. David Levy devotes a chapter 
of his 2001 book, “How the Dismal Science Got Its Name,” to the claim that the actual spectator 
plays a central role in WN, but it seems very difficult to support the claim that impartial spectator 
theory forms the normative foundation for that work. 
 Of course, this incongruity might simply be yet another example of how Smith’s work 
presaged later developments, in this case, methodological differences across disciplines. 
Whereas the acquisition and content of moral knowledge falls squarely in the domain of moral 
philosophy, the mainstream in economics tends to maintain its distance from moral values and, 
even more, from reflection on how to acquire knowledge about them. Although growing 
numbers of economists take interest in these questions, traditionally most have held a range of 
alternate or fairly narrow views about morality. These include a Weberian belief in value free 
science, skepticism about the sincerity of moral motivation, and the implicit or explicit 
endorsement of efficiency alone, i.e., the maximization of economic value as the single goal. 
This final view has dominated most economics, and Smith was likely wearing his economist’s 
hat when advocating for free markets. But, as just noted, Smith did not, in fact, shun normative 
statements in WN. Moreover, the problem raised here does not concern the differences in such 
statements across the two works but rather the absence of an epistemic model for them in WN. 
 One might counter that, although moral judgments are not derived from an epistemic 
model in WN, many of the values promoted in WN, such as justice, were developed from the 
impartial spectator model in TMS. This point is quite correct and helps to clarify the precise 
problem I wish to address. The crux of the problem is the lack of a thoroughly developed and 
distinct epistemic model for social ethics in either TMS or WN. Alternately, it is the failure to 
provide a compelling case that the epistemic model for personal ethics so thoroughly developed 
in TMS logically extends to social ethics. Despite its discussion of social ethics, the focus of 
TMS, particularly on matters of the acquisition of moral knowledge, is on personal relationships. 
The impartial spectator is born and nurtured in repeated, personal contacts. In sociology, people 
are often thought to make moral distinctions between their personal and impersonal 
relationships, which Tönnies (1887) called Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, respectively. 
Moreover, as discussed below, empirical evidence suggests that these relationships differ not 
only in the strength of the role for self-interest but sometimes also qualitatively in terms of the 
moral rules that are activated (Konow, Saijo and Akai, 2009). Thus, Smith commits the fallacy 
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of composition in seeking to apply his epistemic model for personal ethics to social ethics. 
 At any rate, I raise this “problem” not because I think it is such an inherently interesting 
puzzle in the history of philosophy. Rather, I maintain that the subject matter of this gap is of 
great philosophical, social and economic significance. But I also argue that Smith’s own writings 
on moral philosophy contain the elements for a promising approach to filling this gap. The 
question of how we identify right conduct, or the rules that govern right conduct, in impersonal 
relationships, such as in markets or in relations between countries, is a terribly important one for 
both philosophy and the social sciences. Rawls (1971), for instance, does not disregard it when 
he addresses the distribution of broadly defined goods at the social level with a clearly specified 
thought experiment in the social contract tradition. Social scientists are called upon to 
recommend and design policies that have wide-ranging impacts on society, including on income 
and wealth distribution, education, poverty, health care and the environment. But the optimal 
recommendations depend on the presumed moral values, which themselves must be ascertained 
and justified according to some criteria. 
 In addition to doubts about the validity of extending the impartial spectator model to 
social ethics, this model is vulnerable on several counts as a basis for personal ethics (making it, 
a fortiori, a dubious foundation for social ethics). So, I will now attempt to punch a few holes in 
impartial spectator theory as such. I will also argue, however, that Smith expressed an awareness 
of vulnerabilities of his theory. Indeed, although his 18th century station denied him access to 
modern social science tools, he directs us towards the elements of such a solution. I will structure 
this discussion around the three previously discussed properties of the imagined spectator. I 
begin with sympathy, which, as interpreted here, strikes me as the least controversial and 
vulnerable component of the theory. Then we will turn to impartiality and information, 
respectively, which relate more closely to the main topic of this paper. 
 Although Smith’s sympathy is often interpreted in terms of feelings alone, I have argued 
here that Smith’s tone and words imply sympathy is also a cognitive exercise. This interpretation 
finds support, I believe, based both on a priori reasoning and empirical findings. Cognitive 
sympathy enables the spectator to enlarge his set of relevant information and to balance 
competing interests and perspectives. Affective sympathy operates chiefly on the agent to 
provide motivation to right action and to provide direction when the spectator is not fully 
engaged or in control, as a kind of auto-pilot. In addition, if sympathy is to help provide a true 
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moral compass, empirical observation suggests it must carefully balance the two mental 
processes. For example, drawing on wide ranging research in psychology and economics, 
Loewenstein and Small (2007) argue that generosity is a function of both affective and cognitive 
mental processes and that either motive alone is insufficient to generate wise decisions in the 
area of generosity. In particular, they state that affectively motivated generosity alone is erratic 
and immature, responding to irrelevant context specific factors. 
 Regarding impartiality, there are both philosophical and empirical grounds for 
questioning the objectivity of Smith’s imagined spectator. This model, as we have discussed, 
involves one looking inward not to one’s feelings but to one’s feelings if one were an imagined 
other person. Note that this is a kind of second order introspection, but introspection, just the 
same. Eric Schwitzgebel (2008), in a recent contribution to Philosophical Review, makes an 
important and compelling argument, in my view, that introspection is generally highly 
unreliable. He argues it is unreliable in two ways: it sometimes yields no result and at other times 
the wrong result. In fact, there is evidence from social science experiments on moral decision-
making of the latter: people have systematically biased beliefs about what is right. Consistent 
with cognitive dissonance theory (e.g., Festinger, 1957), people are prone to engage in self-
deception, altering their beliefs about what is right in the direction of their own selfish interests, 
which Smith termed self-deceit and is, in modern scholarship, often called a self-serving bias. 
Konow (2000) finds, for example, that even under sterile laboratory conditions that are least 
conducive to self-deception, almost two-thirds of unfairness is still due to such a bias. Moreover, 
Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) describe experimental and field studies demonstrating that the 
self-serving bias significantly impacts behavior, impeding agreements and promoting impasse in 
bargaining, such as with contract negotiations and in civil litigation. They also report that this 
bias is very tenacious, as various experimental attempts to dislodge it demonstrate. Since the 
impartial spectator is conjured by real agents, these considerations should leave us less than 
sanguine about the objectivity of the derived moral judgments. 
 Smith claims the impartial spectator is better informed than the agent, since the former 
considers the interests and perspectives of others. In forming the image, however, the spectator 
accesses the life experiences of the agent. If one accepts the possibility of real impartiality and a 
common moral sense, this seems an improvement over theories of impartiality that rely on 
constraints on information, such as the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, which might require 
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withholding information that could create bias but might, nonetheless, be necessary to render 
accurate moral judgments. Nevertheless, the experiences of the agent also limit the imagination 
of the spectator, as Weinstein (2006) points out. Recondite information might, at a minimum, be 
a source of error in the spectator’s reasoning. Of particular concern, research on self-deception 
indicates that self-serving biases arise chiefly through the biased collection and recollection of 
information. Thus, agents, the progenitors of the spectator, are inclined to provide the latter with 
information that exhibits a self-serving bias. 
 In addition, much empirical research on decisions of groups rather than individuals 
indicates the possibility of more balanced processes and outcomes with groups. An example of 
this is research on deliberation, such as that reviewed in the Elster (1998) volume, a research 
agenda originally inspired by Habermasian (1983) discourse theory. This also emerges in many 
studies of procedural justice. The experimental study of Sulkin and Simon (2001) indicates that 
opportunities to share information and opinions produce both fairer outcomes and more 
favorable perceptions of the outcome itself. Even without these empirical findings, there are a 
priori reasons for being suspicious of the informational content behind single actor judgments. 
To take a simple example, and perhaps an all too frequent one for some of us, suppose I wish to 
maximize the satisfaction my Aunt Olga takes from my birthday gift to her (and it is also right 
that it should do so). Neither I nor any imagined version of myself knows her tastes and what 
would please her. Certainly, I could do more good with informational input from others, perhaps 
her friends. Of course, there is the well known criticism of spectator theories that their 
informational conditions can never realistically be satisfied. As Zagzebski (2004) points out, no 
spectator can be omniscient. But that is not the point toward which I am driving: I am not 
criticizing spectator theory because it lacks perfection, but rather the claim being developed is 
that, both on a priori grounds and from empirical evidence, the informational conditions of the 
impartial spectator can be improved upon, i.e., that they are dominated by alternative approaches. 
 In this section, I have argued that Smith’s impartial spectator theory is missing a distinct 
epistemic foundation for social ethics. In addition, philosophical and social science research 
raises questions about the spectator approach even for personal ethics and casts doubts on the 
impartiality and information assumptions of his spectator. The following section makes a 
suggestion for addressing these questions, justifying it based on empirical evidence and 
motivating it with elements in Smith’s own writings. 
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 V. From Thought Experiment to Formal Experiment 
 As discussed, Smith’s spectator is a mental image. Another type of spectator Smith 
mentions is a real spectator, i.e., a genuine third party who observes and judges the conduct of 
others. Just as the impartial spectator is an idealized version of the imagination, let us take this a 
step further and construct an idealized version of the real spectator that contains the three main 
properties of the imagined spectator. This person has no personal stake whatsoever, whether 
material or reputational, for example. This fact guarantees that self-interest cannot insinuate itself 
into his judgment and cause a self-serving bias. In addition, this person has the greatest feasible 
access to information that might be relevant to judging conduct and character. Given the absence 
of personal stakes, the process of sorting relevant information from irrelevant information is not 
sullied. Sympathy motivates the real spectator’s desire to commit the resources to the optimal 
acquisition of information, including information about the interests and feelings of all affected 
parties, and to expending the appropriate mental effort to process the facts with respect to 
spectator’s moral sense. Although ideal in the sense just stated, this spectator is not necessarily 
omniscient or infallible in his judgments, because the context and reigning moral standards might 
not require or even permit as a possibility the acquisition of all information. That is, this 
spectator might himself be subject to moral standards that balance the expected moral benefit of 
incremental information against the expected marginal cost in resources of acquiring that 
information. Nevertheless, this spectator could not be improved upon in light of these 
considerations. 
 To be sure, the real spectator is not as prominent feature of TMS as the imagined 
spectator, and Smith uses this exact term only three times in that book, all in Part III. 
Nevertheless, he often refers to real spectators in other words (e.g., III.2.15-24 and III.3.22-24), 
sometimes relating them to the impartial spectator. For example, when writing on gratitude and 
resentment, he states that these feelings “seem proper and are approved of, when the heart of 
every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every indifferent by-stander 
entirely enters into, and goes along with them” (II.i.1.7). 
 On one occasion, real spectators are explicitly mentioned jointly with the imagined 
spectator as the voices that are unwisely ignored by a person who lacks self-command (III.3.26). 
The most detailed discussion of the real spectator, however, is a passage in which Smith 
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acknowledges the kinds of limitations of the imagined spectator that we discussed in the section 
above: “In solitude, we are apt to feel too strongly whatever relates to ourselves: we are apt to 
over-rate the good offices we may have done, and the injuries we may have suffered: we are apt 
to be too much elated by our own good, and too much dejected by our own bad fortune. The 
conversation of a friend brings us to a better, that of a stranger to a still better temper. The man 
within the breast, the abstract and ideal spectator of our sentiments and conduct, requires often to 
be awakened and put in mind of his duty, by the presence of the real spectator: and it is always 
from that spectator, from whom we can expect the least sympathy and indulgence, that we are 
likely to learn the most complete lesson of self-command” (III.3.38). Here Smith addresses the 
effects of the self-serving bias, including the biased processing of information, and the role of the 
real spectator in correcting that bias and prompting the agent to greater objectivity and purer 
motives. Moreover, Smith writes that the less personal the relationship between agent and real 
spectator, the more effective the intervention of the latter. 
 Some commentary on Smith has cast the real spectator in a negative light (e.g., Raphael, 
2007). This can be traced to a narrow reading of the first explicit mention of the real spectator in 
TMS, in which Smith was attempting in later editions to address a criticism of his theory as 
presented in the first edition. Specifically, a potential problem of his impartial spectator is this: if 
the conscience that guides the imagined spectator is a product of society, how is it that the 
conscience sometimes opposes the judgment of society, as we can observe it sometimes does? 
Smith’s response involves distinguishing the imagined spectator from the morally superior “all-
seeing Judge of the world, whose eye can never be deceived, and whose judgments can never be 
perverted” (III.2.33). Smith writes at great length in TMS on the natural harmony between God 
(or Nature) and the moral values fostered through socialization. In countering this particular 
challenge to his theory, however, he devotes two paragraphs to introducing the possibility of 
occasional tension between these forces. In such cases, the imagined spectator seems to be torn 
between the real spectators, whose views normally concur with his own, and a higher authority: 
“The supposed impartial spectator of our conduct seems to give his opinion in our favour with 
fear and hesitation; when that of all the real spectators, when that of all those with whose eyes 
and from whose station he endeavours to consider it, is unanimously and violently against us” 
(III.2.32). Thus, this problem arises not because of some deficiency specific to real spectators, 
but rather because of Smith’s attempt to explain how both real and even imagined spectators 
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might sometimes be at odds with the higher moral authority. Indeed, all three passages explicitly 
mentioning the real spectator imply that the views of the imagined and real spectators are 
typically aligned. 
 So far, I have still not proposed how one might fill the gap discussed in the previous 
section. Before beginning, however, let me be unequivocal in trying to anticipate and address 
two criticisms that might arise in this connection. First, the foregoing discussion should not be 
construed as an attempt to attribute this proposal to Smith. I have not consulted a Ouija board 
that provides me special access to his ghost. Instead, the intent above was to show that Smith 
was aware of some of the potential shortcomings of the imagined spectator and entertained 
elements of a possible solution, which also inspire this proposal. Second, it is not a goal of this 
paper to provide a philosophical justification for the proposal. That is a much larger undertaking 
for another project. Instead, the goal is to demonstrate that, if one buys into the core 
philosophical and empirical claims in TMS, then this proposal represents a reasonable epistemic 
model for acquiring knowledge of personal and social ethics, which employs modern social 
science methods to improve on the original impartial spectator model. Thus, the argument 
proceeds from Smith’s premises, including the universalist view of a common moral sense and 
the position that the judgments of the imagined and real spectators are mostly useful but also 
fallible in the previously noted ways. I seek to invoke the weakest possible assumptions, 
however, and do not base this approach on any further assumptions. Specifically, it is agnostic 
regarding the origin of the moral sense and whether it is formed by society, evolutionary biology 
or a deity; we require only that it be commonly shared by and accessible to real people, albeit 
with error. 
 This suggestion is, in a sense, a modification and extension, in the spirit of empiricism, of 
Smith’s original epistemic model. The impartial spectator that guides Smith’s personal ethics is 
the product of a thought experiment in which the agent imagines an ideal moral judge. The 
current proposal borrows elements of this theory and outlines a so-called “quasi-spectator” who 
is a real person, or rather a set of real persons, who approximates the ideal real spectator. This 
quasi-spectator describes an empirical method that is employed to induce the moral sense, i.e., 
the claim is that the quasi-spectator has value precisely because of the ability to draw on the 
moral sense of the imagined spectator. Thus, it extends Smith’s thought experiment and opens 
the door to a formal experiment. I argue below that a recent and growing empirical research 
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agenda along these lines has already contributed not only to descriptive analysis but also to 
social ethics, at least as practiced in the social sciences. 
 All people are, at different times and to varying degrees, spectators, that is, they observe 
and morally judge situations in which they are not, in any significant sense, stakeholders. It is 
dubious, however, that real people ever actually achieve the state of pure objectivity and optimal 
information of the ideal real spectator. Two questions follow. First, can we approximate the 
conditions of such a spectator? The quasi-spectator method seeks to answer this by eliciting 
empirically the moral judgments of individuals about situations in which their real or imagined 
stakes are minimal and about which they are amply informed. On the face of it, the answer to this 
question is clearly affirmative: social scientists have studied moral judgments for decades using a 
variety of methods, including surveys, laboratory experiments and field data, and some of this 
research draws on studies of quasi-spectators. The second question is whether we can, using 
these methods, identify with some degree of certainty the views of the ideal real spectator. That 
is, what evidence is there that these findings shed light on the moral sense of ideal spectators? 
This second question is really the critical one to defending on normative grounds why one should 
care about the results of such studies. 
 A first step in answering this is to acknowledge that we might, at best, observe impartial 
spectator judgments with error. On the one hand, there are the shortcomings inherent to 
spectators, real or imagined: information is incomplete, cognitive abilities are limited, people 
might project their own stakes on those they are judging, and even views of otherwise objective 
persons can be affected by unrepresentative experiences and beliefs. On the other hand, error is 
inherent to all empirical research, including errors in measurement, data entry, sampling, etc. 
Empirical science approaches these problems by collecting multiple data points and, when 
possible, controlling for such effects, and, when not, treating them as random. The quasi-
spectator method, therefore, not only strives for conditions of impartiality and high information 
but also involves sampling numerous real spectators rather than just one in isolation. The earlier 
discussion of deliberation highlighted the possibilities for more informed and less biased 
decisions. But skeptics of this deliberation argue that deliberative groups, such as juries, are 
often prone through a group dynamic toward extreme views, which Sunstein (2002) calls group 
polarization. Be that as it may, deliberation concerns juries, whereas the quasi-spectator method 
involves judges. That is, the former involves groups whose members communicate with one 
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another and reason jointly, whereas the latter consists of informed individuals who proffer moral 
judgments individually and independently and are not, therefore, subject to group dynamics of 
deliberation. There are potential strengths and weaknesses of both methods, but group 
polarization cannot be a shortcoming of a spectator approach. 
 The social science research on moral values is copious, and much involves elicitation of 
impartial and/or informed views. For example, this can be found in public opinion research in 
political science, attitude surveys in psychology and vignette studies in sociology. To my 
knowledge, however, these studies have not been consciously designed with an eye toward 
testing our second question concerning evidence on the quasi-spectator. For this reason, and in 
the interests of brevity, therefore, I will focus on several studies that were designed with this 
specific intent. 
 First, minimal evidence of impartiality is that the judgments of quasi-spectators should 
differ from those of agents given the bias of the latter. This has been confirmed in a dictator 
experiment (Konow, 2000). In the standard version of this experiment, which I call here the 
“stakeholder treatment,” subjects are anonymously paired, and one subject (the so-called 
“dictator”) is given a sum of real money to divide between himself and his counterpart (the 
“recipient”). In another new “spectator treatment,” a third party divided a sum of money between 
two anonymous subjects. The third party, or spectator, was paid a fixed fee for this decision 
unrelated to her decision. The dictators in the standard stakeholder experiment demonstrated a 
bias, taking for themselves, on average, more than third parties in the spectator treatment gave 
similarly situated subjects in their treatment. Stronger evidence on the impartiality of quasi-
spectators comes from a subsequent vignette study of fairness (Konow, 2009b). There 
stakeholders have different and opposing interests. Since each is biased in his own (opposite) 
direction and away from the right choice, the spectator choices should be a mean of the opposing 
stakeholder choices. That further prediction is confirmed in this study. 
 The above results are about average behavior. Another type of evidence comes from the 
dispersion in views. Stakeholders are expected to exhibit high variance in their judgments for at 
least two reasons: first, their interests are often opposed and, second, individual agents differ in 
the weight they attach to self-interest versus moral conduct. Spectators, on the other hand, should 
value only the morally right choice; given their common moral sense, there should, therefore, be 
a much higher level of consensus in their views. These propositions are confirmed in studies of 
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justice (Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen and Tungodden, 2009, Konow, 2000, Konow, 2009a, and 
Konow, Saijo and Akai, 2009) and in a study that includes reciprocal preferences (Croson and 
Konow, 2009). 
 A potential criticism of the empirical application of spectator theory is that it essentially 
puts morality up for a vote. One might expect this to lead to some capricious and even 
objectionable conclusions. Consider, for example, Smith’s references to the acceptability of 
infanticide or slavery in some societies. This view rightly cautions us to avoid over-simplified 
interpretations of or naïve implementations based on this method. There are several parts to my 
response. 
 First, the mere fact that people sometimes accept certain practices does not necessarily 
imply that they also morally condone them. There is empirical evidence that the views of people 
about what is right sometime differ from what they accept or even prefer (e.g., Ordóñez and 
Mellers, 1993). Thus, Smith declares even infanticide as justified in the early development of 
societies but as abhorrent and indefensible in the later stages, and tolerance of it beyond its time 
is a result of custom and an aberration that is overturned in civilized societies (V.2.15-16). 
 Second, some exemplars advanced in opposition to consideration of folk moral intuition 
are not really counter-examples but really “counter-thought experiments.” That is, statements 
about the moral sense are often based on the speaker’s own beliefs about that sense rather than 
actual findings about it. For example, empirical studies of fairness concerns find little support for 
the premises of Nozick or Rawls about moral intuition that form the foundations for their 
theories (see Konow, 2003). This fact reinforces, rather than diminishes, the importance of 
conducting empirical research on moral views. 
 Third, the power of these ostensible counter-examples derives precisely from and is in 
proportion to our shared moral intuition. Thus, their ability to persuade relates directly to their 
accuracy as a description of our actual values, a fact that itself suggests an empirical study. If our 
Smithian premise of a shared moral intuition is correct, then we should find that we either must 
revise our view of others’ moral beliefs or admit that our own intuition was incorrect and the 
exemplars are not true counter-examples. Furthermore, we cannot rule out the value of empirical 
analysis, even if we abandon the assumption of a shared moral sense. A pluralist, for example, 
strengthens his or her case by demonstrating empirically that group A, in fact, has a different 
moral sense that group B. Alternately, if only a subset of society is seen as capable of meaningful 
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moral reflection, say philosophers, then a given philosopher’s claim establishes its power to 
persuade by being able to demonstrate it is shared with other philosophers. 
 Fourth, just as introspection alone cannot lead to moral certitude, one cannot expect easy 
answers from an empirically informed method. If, however, our assumption of a shared moral 
sense is justified, then counter-intuitive findings might still result from a deficit in the particular 
attempt to access that sense rather than a failure of program as a whole. Indeed, as Weinstein 
(2006) points out, Smith viewed slavery as a departure from virtue and traced its existence to 
failings of pride, self-deceit and lack of sympathy, i.e., to failures of the agent to act on the 
judgment of the impartial spectator, rather than deficiencies of the spectator per se. As Sen 
(2009) writes, “The claim that people would agree on a particular proposition if they were to 
reason in an open and impartial way does not, of course, assume that people are already so 
engaged, or even that they are eager to be so” (pg. xix). Indeed, the quasi-spectator method 
proposes means for determining whether such residual biases have contaminated the results. 
Moreover, as in all intellectual endeavors, it is wise to apply not only inductive but deductive 
reasoning. Citing again Sen, “There is no irreducible conflict here, I argue, between reason and 
emotion, and there are very good reasons for making room for the relevance of emotions” (pg. 
xvii). Thus, it is the work of both moral philosophers and social scientists studying ethics to 
consider carefully derived empirical findings about the moral sense, but also to apply reasoning 
in interpreting and drawing conclusions from such results. 
 Finally, I conclude this section with some findings about the potential value of studying 
both stakeholders and (quasi-)spectators empirically that has implications for descriptive and 
prescriptive analysis. A dictator experiment conducted in the US and Japan (Konow, Saijo and 
Akai, 2009) reveals that spectators and stakeholders apply distinct rules of justice. Spectators in 
both countries allocate very close to the equity rule that requires rewarding others in proportion 
to their merit. Stakeholders, of course, are biased toward their own interests, but to the extent 
they deviate from self-interest and allocate fairly, they are significantly more likely to divide 
their earnings equally rather than proportionately. The level of the personal relationship between 
stakeholders is varied across treatments, e.g., in one treatment stakeholders are anonymous and 
in another they know one another, and we find the more personal the relationship, the more 
equally they allocate. One interpretation of this is the following: spectators are following a moral 
principle, i.e., a rule that applies in impersonal relationships, such as markets, whereas 
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stakeholders, who are by definition in a personal relationship, are affected not only by equity but 
also by a moral norm of equality. That is, one can distinguish moral principles, which apply 
generally and are the sole forces in more impersonal relationships, such as work, markets and 
government, from moral norms that are unique to personal relationships, such as friends, family 
and acquaintances.2 An interesting implication of this conjecture is that moral rules differ based 
on personal versus social ethics, a conclusion that was not obvious when beginning this project 
of going from the impartial spectator theory thought experiment to a quasi-spectator laboratory 
experiment. Moreover, this finding corroborates the necessity of distinguishing personal ethics 
from social ethics. A further implication is that there is sometimes value in adjusting the 
empirical method to the type of ethical question, personal or social, being targeted. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Casual empiricism suggests that spectatorship is not merely a philosophical ideal or a 
valid empirical method but also a standard for impartiality valued by society at large. We can 
recognize its contours in a variety of social institutions and practices. In the justice system, the 
assignment of judges and juries and the rules of evidence are designed to approach third party 
impartiality while liberally providing relevant information. Politicians are subject to conflict of 
interest provisions, and an important impetus to campaign reform is to sever legislators from 
stakes that might bias how they represent the interests of their constituencies. Although its 
efficacy is debatable, government regulation, at least as an ideal, provides informed, third party 
oversight of industries. Sometimes even private organizations attempt to bolster their impartiality 
credentials by supporting informed (ostensibly independent) verification of their practices, such 
as the Better Business Bureau or ClimateCounts.org, a privately supported organization that 
reports the performance of businesses to limit their greenhouse gas emissions. 
 This paper has focused on spectatorship as a means for acquiring moral knowledge and 
has underscored its importance for philosophical reflection and for social science research and 
social policy. We reviewed Adam Smith’s contribution to designing a model for the acquisition 
of moral knowledge, arguing that ideal moral judgment, in his view, is passed by an imagined 
                                                 
2 A related example can be found in the work of the social psychologist Mikula (1980), who found a generosity bias: 
in choosing between equity or equality, his dictator subjects, who consisted of soldiers in the same unit, chose the 
rule that worked to their disadvantage, i.e., high performers chose equality and low performers chose 
proportionality. That is, the personal relationships of these stakeholders prompted more generous behavior. 
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spectator who is impartial, informed and sympathetic. I considered problems with extending his 
theory from its original domain of personal ethics to social ethics, as well as some vulnerabilities 
of the theory, even within its original context. Then I proposed an epistemic model that draws on 
Smith’s own insights and modern empirical social science methods. The proposed quasi-
spectator method analyzes the moral views of real spectators who approximate the properties of 
impartiality, information and sympathy. Recent empirical studies provide promising results on 
this method. 
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